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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we explore ways of combining experimental data and non-experimental methods to
estimate the differential effects of components of training programs. We show how data from a
multi-site experimental evaluation in which subjects are randomly assigned to any treatment versus
a control group who receives no treatment can be combined with non-experimental regression-
adjustment methods to estimate the differential effects of particular types of treatments. We also
devise tests of the validity of using the latter methods. We use these methods and tests to re-analyze
data from the MDRC Evaluation of California’s Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) program.
While not designed to estimate the differential effects of the Labor Force Attachment (LFA) training
and Human Capital Development (HCD) training components used in this program, we show how
data from this experimental evaluation can be used in conjunction with non-experimental methods
to estimate such effects. We present estimates of both the short- and long-term differential effects
of these two training components on employment and earnings. We find that while there are short-
term positive differential effects of LFA versus HCD, the latter training component is relatively more
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1.  Introduction 
  In this paper, we explore ways of combining experimental data and non-experimental 
methods to estimate the differential effects of components of training programs. In particular, we 
show how data from a multi-site experimental evaluation in which subjects are randomly as-
signed to any treatment versus a control group who receives no treatment can be combined with 
non-experimental regression-adjustment methods to estimate the differential effects of particular 
types of treatments. Our methods allow the implemented programs to vary across sites and 
across subjects within a site. The availability of such experimental data allow us to test, in part, 
the plausibility of our regression-adjustment methods for eliminating selection biases that result 
from non-random assignment of program components to individuals in the various sites. We use 
our method to adjust for across-site differences in background and pre-program variables as well 
as post-randomization local economic conditions and validate our methods on experimentally-
generated control groups is a spirit similar to the approaches taken in Lalonde (1986), Heckman 
and Hotz (1989), Friedlander and Robins, (1995), and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 
1998) Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), and Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Hotz, 
Imbens and Mortimer (2005). 
  An example of why determining how to properly compare the effects of different treat-
ments across sites in order to assess the relative effectiveness of specific treatments arises in the 
case of evaluating welfare reform. Over the last three decades, as the United States has sought to 
reform its welfare system, states have sought to design their mandated welfare-to-work programs 
in order to reduce dependency on welfare and promote work among disadvantaged households. 
Over this period, states differed in the components, or approach, they emphasized in these pro-
grams.   2
  One approach, the “Human Capital Development” (HCD) approach, emphasizes educa-
tion and vocational training programs, such as GED and English as Second Language (ESL) 
programs and vocational training in the health care industry. The HCD approach seeks to im-
prove the basic and job-related skills of welfare recipients. Advocates of this approach argue that 
acquiring such skills are necessary for adults on welfare to “get a job, especially one that is rela-
tively stable, pays enough to support their children and leaves them less vulnerable during an 
economic downturn.”
1 
  The other primary approach used in designing welfare-to-work programs is the “Labor 
Force Attachment” (LFA), such as job clubs, which teaches welfare recipients how to prepare 
résumés and interview for jobs, and assistance in finding jobs. The LFA approach seeks to move 
adults on welfare quickly into jobs, even if they are low paying jobs. Supporters of the LFA ap-
proach “see work as the most direct route to ending … the negative effects of welfare on families 
and children.”
2 The advocates of the LFA approach also argue that it is a better than the formal 
classroom training stressed in the HCD approach to build the skills of most low-skilled adults. A 
natural question is: “Which approach is better?” 
  The MDRC GAIN Evaluation was one of the most influential evaluations that shed light 
on the impacts of these two approaches. Welfare recipients in six California counties were ran-
domly assigned to either a “treatment” group that was to receive services in a county based and 
designed “welfare-to-work” program, or to a “control” group to which these services were de-
nied. Under the GAIN program, California’s counties had considerable discretion designing their 
welfare-to-work programs and counties emphasized the LFA versus HDC approaches to differ-
ent degrees. Thus, the MDRC study conducted separate evaluations of each county’s program, 
                                                 
1 Gueron and Hamilton (2002). 
2 Gueron and Hamilton (2002).   3
where the training components of the program, the populations served and the prevailing local 
economic conditions varied across counties. 
  To date, the results of this experimental evaluation often have been interpreted as favor-
ing the LFA relative to the HCD approach. Based on an analysis of data, three years after after 
random assignment, MDRC found that the largest effects on participants were for Riverside 
County’s GAIN program, a program that emphasized the LFA approach.
3 In contrast, the GAIN 
participants in the three largest of the other counties in the MDRC Evaluation (Alameda, Los 
Angeles and San Diego counties), that placed much greater emphasis on HDC, had much smaller 
gains.
4 The LFA, or “work-first,” approach of Riverside received national (and international) ac-
claim for its success
5 and has become the model for welfare-to-work programs across the na-
tion.
6 
  The fallacy of this conclusion stems from attributing all of the differences in results 
across counties to differences in the treatment approaches used. For example, treatment effects 
could vary across programs due to differences in the populations treated, in the strategies used to 
assign various treatment components across that population and to differences in the economic 
environments and local labor markets conditions.
7 While MDRC made clear in its reports that its 
                                                 
3 Among female heads of households on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in Riverside’s GAIN 
program, the number of quarters in which recipients worked were 63 percent higher than those for the control group, 
and trainees’ labor market earnings were 63 percent higher over the three-year evaluation period. Riverside 
County’s GAIN program emphasized the LFA approach with tightly focused job search assistance, as well as pro-
viding participants with the consistent message “that employment is central and should be sought expeditiously and 
that opportunities to obtain low-paying jobs should not be turned down.” See Hogan (1995) for details. 
4 These counties experienced only a 21 percent increase in quarters of work and a 23 percent increase in earnings 
relative to the outcomes for the control group members in these counties. 
5 For example, the Riverside GAIN program was awarded the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s “Innova-
tions in American Government Award” in 1996. 
6 For example, the State of California strongly encouraged all of the state’s counties to adopt the Riverside LFA ap-
proach in its GAIN programs. 
7 See Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) for a systematic development and treatment of this issue. Also see Bloom, 
Hill and Riccio (2005).   4
experimental design did not allow one to directly draw inferences about the differential impact of 
alternative types of welfare-to-work components such as LFA and HCD, the results have been 
consistently interpreted by policy makers in exactly that way. Thus, the second objective of this 
paper is to use our methods to address directly whether LFA worked better than HCD based on 
data for subjects in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. 
  A third objective of our paper is to distinguish the short-run from the long-run effects of 
LFA versus HCD training components. The formal MDRC GAIN Evaluation was based on ex-
perimental estimates of program impacts for a three-year post-randomization period.
8 Extrapo-
lating from such short run estimates of social program impacts to what will happen in the longer 
run can be misleading, as Couch (1992) and Friedlander and Burtless (1995) have noted. This is 
especially true for assessing the effectiveness of HCD relative to LFA training approaches, since 
HCD training components tend to be more time-intensive treatments and typically take longer to 
complete relative to LFA programs. As such, there is a strong presumption that results from 
short-term evaluations will tend to favor work-first programs over human-capital development 
ones.
9 Estimates of program effects over a longer post-enrollment period are needed to fairly as-
sess the relative long-run benefits of these alternative welfare-to-work strategies. 
  To address the above substantive concerns, we apply our methods to estimate both short- 
and long-term differential effects of the LFA versus HCD training components in a re-analysis of 
the data from the MDRC evaluation of California’s GAIN program. We focus our analysis on 
four of the six California counties (Alameda, Los Angeles, Riverside and San Diego counties) 
                                                 
8 An unpublished MDRC report presents estimates for the first five years after randomization. 
9 A similar point is made by Mincer (1974) in his model of schooling decisions. Therein, Mincer notes that at early 
ages the earnings of individuals who choose additional schooling will be lower than those who choose to go to work 
at early ages, simply because attending school inhibits going to work, even if all alternative activities yield the same 
present value of lifetime earnings. See also Ham and LaLonde (1996).   5
analyzed in original GAIN Evaluation
10 and estimate differential effects for the post-random as-
signment employment, labor market earnings, and welfare participation outcomes of participants 
in this evaluation. We make use of data on these outcomes for a period of nine years after ran-
dom assignment, data that was not previously available. We exploit the data for the control 
groups in this Evaluation to implement the tests of some of the assumptions that justify the use of 
non-experimental regression-adjustment methods. Finally, we consider the extent which infer-
ences about the temporal patterns of training effect estimates are sensitive to post-randomization 
variation in local labor market conditions. As we establish below, our re-analysis of the GAIN -
data leads to a substantively different set of conclusions about the relative effectiveness of LFA 
versus HCD training components. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief de-
scription of California’s GAIN program and the original MDRC evaluation. In Section 3, we 
characterize several alternative treatment effects, including average differential treatment effects 
of two different treatment components, consider the conditions for their identification and dis-
cuss alternative strategies for estimating each. In Section 4, we present estimates of the effects of 
being assigned to receive some training component for four of the six counties in the MDRC 
GAIN Evaluation for a nine-year post-randomization follow-up period. We then present short- 
and long-term estimates of the average differential effects of LFA versus HCD training compo-
nents using regression-adjustment methods on these data and the results for tests on control 
group data that provide a partial assessment of the validity of these methods for estimating aver-
age differential treatment effects. Finally, we offer some conclusions about the implications of 
our findings in Section 5. 
                                                 
10 We omit the two rural counties included in the original MDRC evaluation, (Butte and Tulare), because these rural 
economies are quite different from the four urban counties.   6
2.  The GAIN Program and the MDRC GAIN Evaluation 
  The GAIN program began in California in 1986 and, in 1989, became the state’s official 
welfare-to-work or Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) Program, authorized by 
the Family Support Act.
11 Except for female heads with children under the age of 6, all adults on 
welfare were required to register in their county-of-residence GAIN program.
12 Each registrant 
was administered a screening test to measure a registrant’s basic reading and math skills, with 
the same test being used in all counties. Registrants with low test scores and who did not have a 
high school diploma or GED were deemed “in need of basic education” and targeted to receive 
HCD training components, such as Adult Basic Education (ABE) and/or English as a Second 
Language (ESL) courses. Those judged not to be in need of basic education were to bypass these 
basic education services and either move into LFA, such as job search assistance, or HCD, such 
as vocational or on-the-job training. Decisions about which activities GAIN registrants received 
were under the control of county GAIN administrators. In fact, the legislation that established the 
GAIN program gave California’s 58 counties substantial discretion and flexibility in designing 
their programs, including the types and mix of training components they offered to GAIN regis-
trants.
13 
  MDRC conducted a randomized evaluation of the impacts and cost-effectiveness of the 
GAIN program in six research counties (Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, 
                                                 
11 The legislation that created the GAIN program represented a political compromise between two groups in the 
State’s legislature with different visions of how to reform the welfare system. One group favored the “work-first” 
approach, i.e., use of a relatively short-term program of mandatory job search, followed by unpaid work experience 
for participants who did not find jobs. The other group favored the “human capital” approach, i.e., a program pro-
viding a broader range of services designed to develop the skills of welfare recipients. In crafting the GAIN legisla-
tion, these two groups compromised on a program that contained work-first as well as basic skills and education 
components in what became known as the GAIN Program Model. See Riccio and Friedlander (1992) for a more 
complete description of this model. 
12 See Riccio, et al. (1989) for a more complete description of the criteria for mandated participation. 
13 See Riccio and Friedlander (1992), chapter 1.   7
and Tulare). Beginning in 1988, MDRC randomly assigned a subset of the GAIN registrants in 
these counties, either to an experimental group, which was eligible to receive GAIN services and 
subject to its participation mandates or to a control group, which was ineligible for GAIN ser-
vices but could seek (on their own initiative) alternative services in their communities. Control 
group members were embargoed from GAIN services until June 30, 1993 and, for two years af-
ter this date they were allowed, but not required, to participate in GAIN. MDRC collected data 
on experimental and control group members in the research counties, including background and 
demographic characteristics and pre-random assignment employment, earnings, and welfare 
utilization. Originally, MDRC gathered data on employment, earnings and welfare utilization,
14 
for a three-year post-randomization period and reported on the findings for these outcomes in 
their primary GAIN Evaluation reports.
15 
  Descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the participants in the MDRC evaluation in the 
four counties analyzed here (Alameda, Los Angeles, Riverside and San Diego) are provided in 
Table 1. We focus on GAIN registrants who were members of single-parent households on 
AFDC—which are referred to as AFDC Family Group or AFDC-FG households—at the time of 
random assignment.
16 Such households constitute over 80 percent of the AFDC caseload in Cali-
fornia and the nation and almost all are female-headed.
17 As shown at the bottom of Table 1, in 
                                                 
14 Most of these data were obtained from state and county administrative data systems. 
15 See Riccio and Friedlander (1992) and Riccio, et al. (1994). In an unpublished paper, Freedman, et al. (1996) pre-
sent impact estimates for five years post-randomization period, based on additional outcomes data gathered from 
administrative data sources. 
16 The samples we utilize for three of the four counties (Alameda, Riverside and San Diego counties) are slightly 
smaller than the original samples used by MDRC due to our inability to find records for some sample members in 
California’s Unemployment Insurance Base Wage system (administered by the California Economic Development 
Department) or because we were missing information on the educational attainment of the sample member. The 
number of cases lost in these three counties is very small, never larger than 1.1 percent of the total sample, and does 
not differ by experimental status. 
17 Descriptions and results for the much smaller group of two-parent households on AFDC (AFDC-U cases) are 
given in the working paper version of the paper (Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2000).   8
all but Alameda county, the counties assigned a larger (and varying) fraction of cases to the ex-
perimental group. Finally, we provide, in Table 1, T-statistics for the differences between experi-
mental and control group means for the background variable. In most cases, there are no statisti-
cally significant differences in these variables by treatment status. The one exception is the year 
and quarter in which cases were enrolled into the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. In particular, there 
are rather large and statistically significant differences in the proportions of experimental and 
control cases enrolled by quarter in Los Angeles and San Diego counties.
18 These were the result 
of changes in the rates of randomization to the control status over the period in these counties as 
MDRC attempted to meet targeted numbers of control cases in these counties. 
  Table 1 reveals notable differences in the demographic and pre-randomization character-
istics of the cases enrolled in the GAIN registrants across counties. These differences stem from 
two factors. First, the composition of the AFDC caseloads varies across counties. Second, the 
strategies that counties adopted for registering participants from their existing caseloads into 
GAIN activities also varied. The GAIN programs in Riverside and San Diego counties sought to 
register all welfare cases in GAIN while the programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties fo-
cused on long-term welfare recipients. For example, Alameda County, which began its GAIN 
program in the third quarter of 1989, first registered its long-term cases and then registered cases 
that had entered the AFDC caseload more recently. The GAIN program in Los Angeles County 
initially only registered those cases that had been on welfare for 3 consecutive years. The conse-
quences of these differences in selection criteria can be seen in Table 1. In Alameda and Los An-
geles, over 95 percent of the cases had been on welfare a year prior to random assignment; in 
San Diego and Riverside, fewer (for some cells much fewer) than 65 percent had been. 
                                                 
18 There are smaller discrepancies between fractions of experimentals and controls by year and quarter in Riverside 
County.   9
  These differences in selection criteria also contributed to substantial differences in the 
employment histories and individual characteristics of the registrant populations across these 
four counties. As shown in Table 1, the registrants in Alameda and Los Angeles counties had, on 
average, much lower levels of earnings prior to random assignment relative to those in Riverside 
and San Diego. Furthermore, the registrants in Alameda and Los Angeles were, on average, 
older, had lower levels of educational attainment, and were more likely to be assessed as “in 
need of basic education” when they entered the GAIN program than the average registrants in 
Riverside and San Diego. The fact that Alameda and Los Angeles counties focused on its “hard 
to treat” cases is a stark example of how the caseload composition within the GAIN experiment 
varied across counties and why it is implausible that all of the differences across counties in 
treatment effects are solely due to the various treatment components. 
  The counties in the GAIN Evaluation also differed with respect to the conditions in the 
labor market immediately prior to random assignment and these differences also may account for 
the across-county differences in the Evaluation subjects displayed in Table 1. Figures 1-4 display 
the time series of two sets of measures of labor market conditions for each of the four counties in 
the GAIN Evaluation. Figure 1 plots the county-level ratio of total employment to the adult 
population and Figure 2 displays the average annual earnings per worker for those employed.
19 
These measures provide indicators of the across-county and over time differences in the labor 
markets for the four counties in the years prior to random assignment. Figures 3 and 4 display the 
corresponding employment-to-population ratios and average annual earnings per work for those 
employed in the retail trade sector, a sector of the economy in which many low-skilled workers 
                                                 
19 These county-level measures were constructed from data from the Regional Economic Information System 
(REIS) maintained by the Bureau of Economic Activity (BEA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. We note that 
Hoynes (2000) uses versions of both of these measures in her analysis of the effects of local labor market conditions 
on welfare spells for the California AFDC caseload during the late 1980s and early 1990s. See her paper for a dis-
cussion of these and other county-level measures of local demand conditions.   10
are employed.
20 In the periods prior to random assignment, overall employment and employment 
in retail trade were increasing in all four counties, although employment had begun to stagnate in 
many of the counties. Furthermore, one notes substantial differences across the four counties in 
these ratios, with Riverside county having a much lower total employment to adult population ra-
tio than the other three counties.
21 Over this same period, average annual earnings per worker 
was increasing in all but Alameda county (Figure 2), while earnings per worker in the retail trade 
sector was declining (in real terms) in all four counties (Figure 4). Moreover, one sees that over-
all earnings, as well as earnings in the retail sector, were higher in Alameda and Los Angeles 
counties relative to Riverside and San Diego counties. Towards the end of the next section, we 
shall comment further on the post-randomization trends in these Figures. 
  Finally, as we noted above, the four analysis counties in the GAIN Evaluation differed in 
the way they ran the programs and in the training components they emphasized. In Table 2, we 
display the proportions of GAIN registrants in the four analysis counties that participated in vari-
ous training components during the period in which subjects were enrolled in the MDRC GAIN 
Evaluation.
22 One can see that Riverside county placed less of its GAIN registrants in HCD 
training components than did the administrators of the GAIN programs in the other four counties 
during the period of enrollment into the MDRC Evaluation. This is especially true relative to the 
proportions of GAIN registrants enrolled in the MDRC Evaluation that were deemed “In Need of 
Basic Skills,” presumably the group in greater need of HCD training components. (The propor-
                                                 
20 Another sector of the economy which employs low-skilled workers is the service sector. Based on measures com-
parable to those in Figures 3 and 4, similar trends and differences across counties were found for this sector as those 
for the retail trade sector. 
21 This difference reflects, in part, the fact that many people residing in Riverside county commute to other counties, 
especially Los Angeles, for their employment compared to residents of the other four counties. 
22 The rows in boxes in this table show the quarters in which the random assignment of registrants into the MDRC 
experimental evaluation was conducted for each of the four counties.   11
tions of these groups, by year/quarter of enrollment into the MDRC Evaluation, are found in the 
last column of Table 2.) As a crude indicator of the relationship between HCD services relative 
to those registrants in need of basic skills, one can take the ratio of the last two columns of Table 
2. By this measure, the GAIN programs in San Diego, Los Angeles and Alameda counties appear 
to provide HCD training services roughly in a 1-to-1 proportion with the fraction of registrants in 
need of basic skills in their counties. In contrast, the corresponding proportion for Riverside 
county’s GAIN program is 2-to-3. 
  The estimates in Table 2 provide a clear indicator of what was a major finding of the 
MDRC GAIN Evaluation, namely that Riverside’s GAIN program had a decidedly “work-first” 
orientation, especially relative to the other three counties in the Evaluation that we analyze 
here.
23 In contrast, program staff in the other research counties placed less emphasis on getting 
registrants into a job quickly. For example, Alameda’s GAIN managers and staff “believed 
strongly in ‘human capital’ development and, within the overall constraints imposed by the 
GAIN model’s service sequences, its staff encouraged registrants to be selective about the jobs 
they accepted and to take advantages of GAIN’s education and training to prepare for higher-
paying jobs.”
24 
                                                 
23 There were other indicators of Riverside’s emphasis on getting GAIN registrants quickly into jobs and on using 
LFA relative to HCD training components. For example, Riverside staff required that their registrants that were en-
rolled in basic skills programs continue to participate in Job Club and other job search activities. In a survey of pro-
gram staff conducted by MDRC at the time of its evaluation, 95 percent of case managers in Riverside rated getting 
registrants into jobs quickly as their highest goal while fewer than 20 percent of managers in the other research 
counties gave a similar response. In the same survey, 69 percent of Riverside case managers indicated that they 
would advise a welfare mother offered a low-paying job to take it rather than wait for a better opportunity, while 
only 23 percent of their counterparts in Alameda county indicated they would give this advice. See Riccio and Fried-
lander (1992) for further documentation of the differences in distribution of training components and other features 
of the full set of six counties in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. As Ricco and Friedlander (1992) concluded from their 
study of the implementation of GAIN programs by the various counties in the MDRC Evaluations, “What is perhaps 
most distinctive about Riverside’s program, though, is not that its registrants participated somewhat less in education 
and training, but that the staff’s emphasis on jobs pervaded their interactions with registrants throughout the pro-
gram.” (Riccio and Friedlander, 1992, p. 58) 
24 See Riccio, et al. (1994), p. xxv.   12
3.  Alternative Treatment Effects and Estimation Strategies 
  In this section, we consider the identification of alternative treatment effects and strate-
gies for estimating them. We begin with a review of binary treatment effects which characterize 
the effect of receiving some training component for enrollees in a welfare-to-work program. 
Such effects were the focus of the experimental design of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. We then 
define and consider the estimation of average differential treatment effects (ADTE). The latter 
effects are the focus of our re-analysis of the GAIN data. We examine the identification of and 
strategies for estimating ADTEs when the econometrician has information on which treatment 
components each subject was assigned and when such subject-level information is not known. 
(The latter case is true for the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data we re-analyze and is true for many 
data sources used to evaluate training programs.) Finally, while we show that experimental data 
on subjects that are randomly assigned to some versus no treatment component is not sufficient 
to identify (or consistently estimate) ADTEs, we show how such data can be exploited to assess 
the validity of non-experimental methods for estimating the ADTEs. 
3.1  Alternative Average Treatment Effects 
 Let  Di be an indicator of the program/location of a training program in which subject i is 
enrolled (registered). In the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, D denotes a county-run welfare-to-work 
program, d. Let s denote the number of periods (years) since a subject enrolled in a welfare-to-
work program. Let  i T   denote the training (treatment) component to which subject i is assigned, 
with  {0,1,..., ,..., } i Tk K ∈   and where  0 i T =   denotes the null (no) treatment component. Let  i T  
denote the assignment of the i
th subject to some treatment component, i.e.,  1{ 1} ii TT =≥  . Finally, 
Let ( ) is YW w =  denote subject i’s potential outcome as of s periods after enrollment that is asso-  13
ciated with the subject being assigned to treatment W, where W=T or T  . Thus,  ( 0) is YT =  is the 
potential outcome associated with the receipt of no treatment,  ( 1) is YT =  is the potential outcome 
associated with the assignment to some treatment component and  () ( ) is is Yk YT k ≡ =   is the poten-
tial outcome associated with the assignment to treatment component k. 
  The focus of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, and many other training evaluations, was on 
estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) associated with assignment to 
some treatment component in program/location d. This treatment effect is defined as 





si s i s i i
is i i





where Δis is subject i’s “gain” in outcome Y from being assigned to some training component.
25 
Analogously, the average treatment effects associated with assignment to treatment component k 
for those assigned to this component is given by 
   ( )
()
() () ( 0 ) 1 ,
() 1 ,
d
si s i s i i
is is i
kE Y k Y T D d
Ek TD d
α ≡− = =
=Δ = =
 (2) 
  As noted in Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005), 
d
s α  may differ across programs/locations 
(d), due to differences in: (a) the populations treated; (b) treatment heterogeneity (differences in 
the distribution of treatment components); and/or (c) differences in economic conditions (“macro 
effects”). In the case of treatment heterogeneity, one typically wishes to distinguish between the 
impacts of alternative treatment components—such as the LFA and HCD training components—
in order to isolate this source of differences in 
d
s α  across programs and to isolate why some pro-
                                                 
25 One also can define versions of 
d
s α  that condition on some set of exogenous variables, X, 
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Conditional versions of the other treatment effects defined in this subsection can be defined similarly.   14
grams are more effective than others. As noted in the Introduction, and as will be documented in 
Section 4, the impacts of the Riverside GAIN program were markedly different from, and more 
effective than, those in the other counties of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Accordingly, consider 
the average differential treatment effect (ADTE) of two treatment components, k and k′, among 
those who are treated (i.e., those assigned to receive some treatment) which is defined as: 
  ( )
()
(, ) () ( ) 1
() ( ) 1
si s i s i
is is i
kk EY k Y k T
Ek k T
γ ′′ ≡−=
′ = Δ− Δ =
, (3) 
where the second equality in (3) follows from the definition of Δis(j) in (2). Note that  ( , ) s kk γ ′  is 
defined for subjects assigned to receive some treatment, i.e., for subjects characterized by Ti = 1. 
For reasons that will be made clear below, conditioning on this expansive set of subjects is ap-
propriate for our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data. Imbens (2000) and Lechner 
(2001) consider alternative definitions of differential treatment effects, including conditioning on 
those subjects who would otherwise receive either treatment components k or k′. In general, dif-
ferences in such conditioning imply different treatment effects. Also note that we have not con-
ditioned (3) on a particular program/location (d), as our interest is in estimating the differential 
effects of treatment components that are available—and comparable—across county welfare-to-
work programs included in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. 
3.2  Identification and Estimation of 
d
s α  
  As is well understood, the identification (and thus consistent estimation) of 
d
s α  in (1) re-
quires additional conditions to be met. In general, non-random and selective assignment of po-
tential trainees to training programs and/or the use of non-comparable comparison groups to 
measure Y(0) gives rise to problems in identifying (and obtaining unbiased estimates of) such   15
treatment effects.
26 In the context of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, the identification problem is 
“solved by design” in that this evaluation randomly selected a group of the GAIN registrants to a 
control group in which subjects, who would otherwise have been assigned to some welfare-to-
work activity, were embargoed from receipt of treatment. That is, design of this evaluation as-
sured that the following condition holds: 
(RANDOM ASSIGNMENT)  ( ) (0), (1) ii si s i TY Y D d ⊥ = , (C-1) 
for all d, where zy ⊥  denotes that z is (statistically) independent of y. Condition (C-1) insures 
the identification of 
d
s α  as it implies that 
  () ( ) (0) 1, (0) 0, is i i is i i EY T D d EY T D d == = == , (C-1′) 
i.e., the mean value of Y(0) in period s for those who receive some treatment component (T = 1) 
in county d would be equal to the mean of observed outcomes for control group members (T = 0) 
in the same period and county. As a result, (C-1) implies that the ATET associated with pro-
gram/location d is identified by 
  () ( ) (1) 1, (0) 0,
d
si s i i i s i i EY T D d EY T D d α == = −= =  (4) 









= ∑  for all s, where Nt is the sample size for the Ti = t group, t = 0,1. In 
Section 4, we present county-specific estimates of the ATET for a range of post-randomization 
outcomes for each of the nine years after random assignment. 
3.3  Identifying Average Differential Treatment Effects 
We next consider the identification (and estimation) of the average differential treatment 
effect, ( , ) s kk γ ′ . For now, we assume that we know (and can condition on) the treatment compo-
                                                 
26 See, for example, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a survey of the evaluation literature.   16
nents to which each subject was assigned. Below, we consider the case in which a subject’s 
treatment component assignment is unknown. Random assignment of subjects to Ti = 1 or 0 
[Condition (C-1)], the condition that holds in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, is not sufficient to 
identify ADTEs. To see why, consider the following characterization of the differences in ex-
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for all k, k ′,  k  ≠  k′, and all d,  d′. While (C-1) implies that  ( ) (0) 1, is i i E YTD d ==  = 
() (0) 0, is i i E YT D d == , it does not imply that the last term in braces in (5) equals zero, even for 
the same program/location (i.e., d = d′). Furthermore, (C-1) implies nothing about the first term 
in braces. As such, the mean difference between the outcomes of those receiving treatment com-
ponent k and those receiving k′ does not, in general, equal  ( , ) s kk γ ′ . Additional assumptions are 
required. In particular, we require: 
  () ( ) (0) 1, , (0) 1, , 0 is i i i is i i i EY T T kD d EY T T kD d ′′ == = − == ==  , (A-1) 
i.e., there is no difference in Y(0), the no-treatment outcome, for subjects that were assigned to 
treatment components k and k′, in a given program/location, and 
  () ( ) () () 1 , , () 1 , , () 1 is i i i is i i i is i Ek TT k D d Ek TT k D d Ek T ′′ Δ = = ==Δ = = = =Δ =  , (A-2) 
for all k, k′, k ≠ k′, and all d, d′, i.e., the expected gross treatment effects for treatment component 
k is the same for those assigned to components k and k′.
27 Given (A-1) and (A-2), it follows that 
                                                 
27 We ignore the possibility that both (A-1) and (A-2) are violated with off-setting biases.   17
the difference between  () () , is i i EY kT kD d ==   and  ( ) () , is i i EY k T kD d ′ ′′ ==   in (5) is equal to 
(, ) s kk γ ′ . Note that potentially weaker versions of (A-1) and (A-2) in which these assumptions 
hold only within a program/location (d = d′) could be assumed, although then only program-spe-
cific ( , ) s kk γ ′ ’s would be identified. In short, the random assignment design used in evaluations, 
such as the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, is not sufficient to identify ADTEs. 
In order to secure identification (and a consistent estimator) of  ( , ) s kk γ ′ , we consider the 
use of non-experimental methods which imply that (A-1) and (A-2) hold under some set of cir-
cumstances. In our discussion, we describe the use of statistical matching methods in conjunction 
with data in which subjects are randomly assigned to receive some treatment or a control group. 
Matching methods assume that by controlling (adjusting) for a set of pre-treatment characteris-
tics, Zi, in a non-parametric way, conditional versions of (A-1) and (A-2) will hold.
28 More pre-
cisely we assume that there exists a vector, Zi, such that:
29 
(UNCONFOUNDEDNESS)  (0), (1),..., ( ),..., ( ) ,   and . YY Y kY KT Zk d ⊥ ∀∀   (C-2) 
That is, the potential outcomes associated with treatment components are independent of the as-
signment mechanism for these components conditional on Z. It follows from (C-2) that 
  () ( ) (0) 1, , (0) 1, , 0 is i i i is i i i i Z EY T T k D d E Y T T k D dZ ⎡⎤ ′′ == = − == = = ⎣⎦
  (A-1′) 
and 
  () ( ) () 1 , , () 1 , , 0 is i i i is i i i i Z Ek T T k D d E k T T k D d Z ⎡⎤ ′′ Δ= = = − Δ= = = = ⎣⎦
 , (A-2′) 
for all k, k′, k ≠ k′, and all d, d′. It follows that assumptions (A-1′) and (A-2′) imply that the dif-
                                                 
28 See Rubin (1973a, 1973b, 1977, 1979) for the initial formalization of the use of matching methods to reduce bias 
in causal inference using non-experimental data. See also Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998a) for further 
refinements on these methods. 
29 See Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) for formal treatments of matching methods in the context of multiple treat-
ments.   18
ference between the conditional (on Z) versions of  ( ) () , is i i EY kT kD d ==   and 
() () , is i i EY k T kD d ′′′ ==   identify  ( , ) s kk γ ′  and justify the use of matching methods—and, in cer-
tain cases, parametric regression techniques—to (consistently) estimate this ADTE. 
  Condition (C-2)—and, thus, (A-1′) and (A-2′)—is not directly verifiable, at least not for 
situations in which treatment components are not randomly assigned. As such, matching methods 
are inherently more controversial than reliance on a properly designed random assignment ex-
periment. Nonetheless, recent studies by Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd (1997, 1998a), and Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) suggest that such adjustments, with 
sufficiently detailed pre-treatment characteristics, can produce credible non-experimental esti-
mates of average treatment effects.
30 Here we extend the use of these methods to estimating the 
differential effects of alternative treatment components. 
  The availability of data for a randomly assigned control group that receives no treatment, 
such as is the case with the MDRC GAIN Evaluation, does provide scope for assessing the va-
lidity of assumption (A-1′) in the case where there are only two treatment components, k and k′. 
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for all d, where  () Pr
k
di i PT k D d ≡= =   is the proportion of subjects receiving treatment compo-
                                                 
30 See Smith and Todd (2005) for a critical re-analysis of Dehejia and Wabba (1999). Smith and Todd conclude that 
matching methods can be used to estimate simple treatment effects, but care must be taken as to what pre-treatment 
characteristics are used in the matching.   19
nent k in program/location d. It follows from (A-1′) [and (C-1)] that the term in square brackets 
after the last equality in (C-1′′) is equal to 0, for all d. That is, the mean of Y for the control group 
should not depend on (vary with) 
k
d P . Thus, to test (A-1′), one can regress the outcomes, Y, on 
k
d P , exploiting the variation in the mix of treatment components across programs/locations, and 
where the regression conditions on Zi, either non-parametrically using matching methods or para-
metrically using regression methods, and test whether the coefficient on 
k
d P  equals zero for all d. 
We implement this test in our empirical analysis to assess the validity of (A-1′) with the MDRC 
GAIN Evaluation data.
31 
  A similar test of the validity of (A-2′) is not available. Thus, this assumption must be 
maintained when using matching methods to estimate ADTEs. Nonetheless, the validity of such 
methods in the estimation of ADTEs is more plausible, although not guaranteed, if (A-1′) is 
shown to hold in the data. 
  Until now, we have assumed knowledge of the treatment component assignments ( i T  ) to 
each subject who actually receives treatment. This is not the case for the MDRC GAIN Evalua-
tion data that we use to analyze the differential effects of LFA and HCD treatment components. 
Individual-level treatment component assignments are unknown in these data. Lack of treatment 
component assignment information is a common situation in other data sources used to evaluate 
the effects of training programs. However, one may have information on the proportions of sub-
jects that received various treatment components (
k
d P ) for particular programs. For the GAIN 
programs in California, we have information on these proportions for the four counties we ana-
                                                 
31 For other examples of assessing the validity of non-experimental methods with data from experimental data, see 
Lalonde (1986), Rosenbaum (1987), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith and Todd (1997, 1998a), Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) and Smith and Todd (2005).   20
lyze from the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. In fact, we have it at the quarterly level for the quarters 
in which GAIN registrants were randomly assigned to treatment or control status. 
  As first noted by Heckman and Robb (1985), and subsequently extended by Mitnik 
(2004b) to the case of differential treatment effects, estimation of causal effects in the case of 
unknown treatment status at the subject level can still proceed with data on treatment component 
probabilities under certain assumptions and with sufficient variation in these probabilities across 
programs and/or subgroups. Assumptions (A-1′) and (A-2′)—and, thus, (C-2)—are sufficient to 
allow one to estimate  ( , ) s kk γ ′  with only data on treatment assignment proportions, rather than 
individual-level treatment assignment status, since conditional on Z, the identification (consistent 
estimation) of  ( , ) s kk γ ′  only requires identifying (consistently estimating) the mean differential 
of outcomes for trainees who receive treatment components k and k′. Furthermore, we exploit the 
variation in 
k
d P  across counties, as well as across entry cohorts, to consistently estimate these 
conditional mean differences. 
3.4  Estimating Average Differential Treatment Effects 
  In the empirical analysis presented below, we make use of parametric regression meth-
ods, rather than non-parametric matching techniques, to condition on the Z’s as implied by as-
sumptions (A-1′) and (A-2′)
32 to estimate the average differential treatment effect of the LFA 
versus HCD treatment components.
33 For sake of clarity, we need to augment the notation used 
above. Let Yis,dc denote the outcome of GAIN registrant i for post-randomization period s that is 
                                                 
32 While not presented herein, we also used non-parametric matching techniques, controlling for the same set of X’s 
listed above, to estimate the differential treatment effects between Riverside and the various comparison counties. 
The estimates, especially the inferences drawn, are quite similar to the regression-based estimates reported below. 
33 See Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) for a discussion of efficient estimation of average treatment effects using 
propensity score methods. Also see Abadie and Imbens (2006) who characterize the asymptotic properties of match-
ing estimators for average treatment effects.   21
located in county d and entered the MDRC Evaluation in quarter c; Ti,dc = 1 if this GAIN regis-
trant located in county d and from entry cohort c was (randomly) assigned to the experimental 
group and equal to zero otherwise;  , id c T   denote the treatment component to which a GAIN regis-
trant is assigned, where the components in the GAIN context are A for the LFA treatment com-
ponent and h for the HCD treatment component; Zi,dc denote the vector of pre-randomization 
characteristics for this subject; and  dc P
A  denote the proportion of trainees—those for which Ti,dc = 
1—that were assigned the LFA treatment component ( , id c T =  A ) component. 
  One potential strategy for estimating  ( , ) s h γ A  would be to estimate the following regres-
sion model using only data on GAIN registrants in the experimental group (Ti,dc = 1): 
  ,0 1 , , (,) is dc s s dc s i dc is dc Yh P Z β γβ ε ′ =+ + +
A A , (6) 
where εis,dc is a stochastic disturbance assumed to have mean zero and the coefficient on  dc P
A  is 
the ADTE of interest,  ( , ) s h γ A . (The elements in Zis,dc are listed in the Notes to Table 5.) Estimat-
ing (6) with the experimentals subsample will generate consistent estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  if both as-
sumptions (A-1′) and (A-2′) hold and that the population regression function for Yis,dc is linear in 
dc P
A  and Zi. We present estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  based on only using data for the experimental group 
of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation in Table 6 below. 
To test assumption (A-1′), one can estimate the regression specification in (6) using data 
for the subsample of controls in the four counties of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation and then test 
the hypothesis that  ( , ) s h γ A  = 0. We present results for this test in Table 4 below. A potentially 
more rigorous version of this test allows for the possibility that  ( , ) s h γ A  varies across counties, 
i.e., estimating the following regression specification in place of (6),   22




is dc s s jc i s i dc is dc
jA L R S
Yh P I Z β γβ ε
∈
′ =+ + + ∑
A A , (6′) 
where 
j
i I  denotes the indicator function for Di = j and the four values for j are A for Alameda 
county, L for Los Angeles county, R for Riverside county and S for San Diego county. In this 
case, we test the null hypothesis that  ( , )
A
s h γ A  =  ( , )
L
s h γ A  =  ( , )
R
s h γ A  =  ( , )
S
s h γ A  = 0, where now 
the alternative hypothesis is that  ( , )
d
s h γ A  can be non-zero in any county. We also present results 
from this second test of (A-1′) in Table 4 below. 
  In one sense, finding that we cannot reject the null hypotheses in the above tests justifies 
the maintenance of assumption (A-1′), and, thus, the reliance on the estimator of  ( , ) s h γ A  derived 
from estimating (6) with data for registrants that were randomly assigned to the experimental 
group in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. But, as is always true, the results from such tests are sub-
ject to estimation error. That is, the power of any test may not be sufficient to avoid Type II er-
rors, i.e., failing to reject null hypotheses when they are false. To guard against this possibility, 
we also present results from a “difference-in-differences” (DID) estimator of  ( , ) s h γ A  that relies 
on using data for experimental and control groups in estimation. In particular, this DID estimator 
of ( , ) s h γ A  is formed by estimating the following regression function:
34 
  ,0 1 2 , , 3 , 4 , , , (,) is cd s s dc s i dc s dc i dc s i dc s i dc i dc is dc YP T h P T Z Z T β ββ γ β β ν ′′ =+ + + + + +
AA A , (7) 
Using (7) to estimate  ( , ) s h γ A  with data for the experimental and control groups in the MDRC 
GAIN Evaluation still relies on assumptions (A-1′) and (A-2′) to hold but allows the data on 
“controls” to empirically adjust for across-program differences in populations and treatment 
component assignment mechanisms to help isolate a consistent estimate of  ( , ) s h γ A . Furthermore, 
the DID estimator allows for any estimation error that may affect the tests of (A-1′) described 
                                                 
34 Non-parametric versions of (7), based on matching methods, also are possible.   23
above to explicitly affect the precision of the estimate of  ( , ) s h γ A , which is not the case for the 
estimator of  ( , ) s h γ A  based solely on data for experimentals. Accordingly, we view the DID esti-
mator as a more “conservative” method for estimating  ( , ) s h γ A . Estimates based on this DID esti-
mator are presented in Table 5 below. 
3.5  Post-Randomization Variation in Labor Market Conditions 
  To this point, we have implicitly assumed that temporal variation in treatment effects re-
flects the profile of “returns” to training. For example, the relative effects of receiving vocational 
training course received at s = 0 may decline over time as skills acquired in such a course depre-
ciate. How rapidly the effects of alternative treatments decline with s, if they decline at all, can 
provide important insights into the long-term effectiveness of alternative training strategies. But, 
treatment effects also may vary over time due to post-training changes in environmental factors, 
such as local labor market conditions. Recall that Yis,dc(k), the outcome of the i
th subject residing 
in county d and in GAIN entry cohort c that occurred s periods after receiving treatment k, can be 
written as 
  ,,, () ( 0 ) () is dc is dc is dc YkY k = +Δ , (8) 
where Yis,dc(0) is the potential outcome associated with the null treatment and Δis,dc(k) is the gain 
in Y from receiving treatment k relative to the null treatment. Let Mds denote the labor market 
conditions that prevail in county d in the calendar period corresponding to s. Suppose that labor 
market conditions affect post-training outcomes. For example, a trainee’s probability of being 
employed in period s (s > 0) depends with the extent of the local demand for labor in that period. 
We represent this dependence by rewriting (8) as follows 
  ,,, (, ) ( 0 , ) (, ) is dc ds is dc ds is dc ds Yk M Y M k M = +Δ . (9) 
The right-hand side of (9) allows both the potential outcome for the null treatment and the gain   24
associated with treatment k to vary with Mds. 
  The dependence of treatment effects on labor market conditions hinges on whether 
Δis,dc(k) varies with Mds. Allowing Yis,dc(0) to depend on Mds need not compromise the ability to 
identify or estimate labor market invariant treatment effects so long as Δis,dc(k) is independent of 
Mds. If the latter condition holds, evaluation data in which all treatments, including a null treat-
ment, are randomly assigned can be used to generate unbiased estimates of Yis,dc(0,Mds) and 
Δis,dc(k), for all k, and, thus, unbiased estimates of labor market invariant treatment effects. In the 
absence of data with randomly assigned treatments, additional conditions, such as (C-2) and/or 
(A-1′) and (A-2′), would be required to obtain consistent estimates of labor market invariant 
treatment effects. 
 However,  if  Δis,dc(k) does vary with Mds, data for which treatments are randomly assigned 
or for which an unconfoundedness condition holds will not be sufficient to isolate (identify) la-
bor market invariant treatment effects. In this case, all one can identify non-parametrically is 
Δis,dc(k,Mds) which implies that average treatment effects will, in general, depend on the distribu-
tion of post-training labor market conditions, both across localities and over time. 
  To explore the potential importance of heterogeneity in  ( , ) s h γ A  with respect to post-
treatment labor market conditions, we estimate the following modified version of the DID esti-
mating equation in (7): 
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,   (10) 
which include interactions of a vector of county-specific, post-training labor market conditions, 
Mds, with Ti,dc and  , dc i dc PT
A . The specification of the interactions of local labor market conditions 
with the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training in (10) is somewhat arbitrary. However,   25
it does allow us to examine the possible dependence of treatment effects on Mds by testing the 
significance of the interactions of Mds with Ti,dc and  , dc i dc PT
A . Moreover, the estimates of  0(,) s h γ A  
based on (10) provide a measure of the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training compo-
nents net of across time and across county differences in labor market conditions. We present the 
latter estimates in Tables 5 and 6 below. 
  Adjusting for post-random assignment labor market conditions may be important in the 
context we analyze. The four counties in the MDRC GAIN Evaluation that we analyze experi-
enced notable changes in labor market conditions over the nine-year post-randomization period. 
Moreover, there are notable differences in these conditions across counties over this period. Such 
differences are evident in Figures 1-4, which display, in addition to pre-random assignment val-
ues, county-specific trends in four different measures of labor market conditions over the 9-year 
post-random assignment period. As shown in Figure 1, the employment rates for all sectors of 
the economy declined markedly in the first three to five years after random assignment in each of 
the four counties we analyze and did not recover until years 6 through 9 after random assign-
ment. This temporal pattern in employment reflects the recession that California experienced in 
1990 and 1991 and the State’s economic recovery in the latter half of the 1990s. A similar pat-
tern characterized the employment in the State’s retail trade sector over the post-randomization 
period (Figure 3) with one notable exception, Riverside county, where retail trade employment 
grew steadily throughout the post-randomization period at an average annual rate of one percent.  
  Over the same period, there was little change in the average real earnings per worker of 
all workers in the four counties, although Alameda county experienced an average annual im-
provement per year in earnings per worker of almost one percent and Riverside county experi-
enced a slight decline throughout the post-randomization period (Figure 2). The earnings per   26
worker in the retail trade sector (Figure 4)—a sector which employs a sizeable fraction of low-
skilled workers—steadily declined over the first 5-6 years after random assignment and showed 
some recovery after year 6, especially in Alameda county. We explore whether these across 
county and temporal differences in the labor market conditions affected the temporal patterns in 
the unadjusted estimates of the differential treatment effects of LFA versus HCD training on the 
labor market outcomes of enrollees in the MDRC Gain Evaluation. 
4.  Re-Analyzing the Effects of the California GAIN Welfare-to-Work Program, the 
MDRC Evaluation and GAIN Evaluation Counties 
4.1  Estimates of Nine-Year, County-Specific GAIN Impacts 
  In this section, we present estimates of the short- and longer-run impacts of being as-
signed to some GAIN training component (
d
s α ) for AFDC-FG derived from the county-specific 
experiments of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation.
35 We present impact estimates for three different 
outcomes: (1) ever employed during year; (2) number of quarters worked per year; and (3) an-
nual labor market earnings.
36 Mean differences between the experimental and control groups for 
                                                 
35 In a previous version of this paper, we examined the average (and differential) treatment effects for an additional 
set of outcomes and for other subgroups of the caseloads for the four counties. In particular, we also examined the 
treatment effects on two measures of post-randomization welfare participation, namely, whether the registrant re-
ceived AFDC benefits—or benefits from AFDC’s successor program, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program, that began in California in 1998—during the year; and the number of quarters in the calendar year 
that she received AFDC/TANF benefits For these outcomes and those for employment and earnings, we also gener-
ated treatment effect estimates separately for AFDC-FG cases determined to be in need and not in need of basic 
education. The results for these additional analyses can be found at 
www.econ.ucla.edu/hotz/GAIN_extra_results.pdf. 
36 The employment and earnings outcomes were constructed with data from the State’s UI Base Wage files provided 
by the California Employment Development Department (EDD). These data contain quarterly reports from employ-
ers on whether individuals were employed in a UI-covered job and their wage earnings for that job. These quarterly 
data were organized into four-quarter “years” from the quarter of enrollment in the MDRC GAIN evaluation. The 
“Ever Employed in Year” outcome was defined to be = 1 if the individual had positive earnings in at least one quar-
ter during that year and = 0 otherwise. The “Annual Earnings” outcome was the sum of the four-quarter UI-covered 
earnings recorded for an individual in the Base Wage file. All income variables were converted to 1999 dollars using 
cost-of-living deflators. 
The AFDC/TANF variables were constructed using data from the California statewide Medi-Cal Eligibility Data 
System (MEDS) files, which contain monthly information on whether an individual received AFDC (before 1998) 
or TANF (starting in 1998) benefits in California during a month. These monthly data were organized into 3-month   27
3-year averages of these outcomes are found in Table 3. As noted above, MDRC has published 
such estimates for these outcomes for the first 3 years of post random assignment data and re-
leased corresponding estimates based on 5 years of post-random assignment data in a working 
paper.
37 While the actual estimates presented in Table 3 are similar to the MDRC 5-year results, 
they differ slightly due to slight differences in the samples used and, more importantly, the use of 
a different “dating” convention when calculating the measured outcomes.
38 Given that these 
shorter-term estimates have been thoroughly discussed in MDRC publications, we focus most of 
our discussion on the longer-term impacts for 5 through 9 years after random assignment. 
  Consider first the estimated GAIN impacts on employment outcomes. Regardless of 
whether one uses annual employment rates or the number of quarters employed in a year, the es-
timated impacts of Riverside’s program are consistently larger, and more likely to be statistically 
significant, compared to the effects for the other three counties over the first three years after 
random assignment. Over this period, the GAIN registrants in Riverside had annual employment 
rates that were, on average, 13.6 percentage points (39 percent) higher than members of the con-
trol group and worked 0.43 more quarters per year (48 percent) higher than did control group 
members. The employment impacts of the GAIN programs in the GAIN programs of the other 
three counties are considerably smaller in magnitude and often are not statistically significant. 
This apparent relative success of the Riverside GAIN training components in improving the em-
                                                                                                                                                             
“quarters” from the quarter of enrollment in the MDRC GAIN evaluation and then organized into “years” since en-
rollment, as was done with the employment and earnings data. The “Ever Received AFDC/TANF Benefits in Year” 
variable was defined to be = 1 if the individual received AFDC or TANF benefits in at least one month during that 
year and = 0 otherwise. 
37 See Riccio, et al. (1994) for 3-year impact estimates and Freedman, et al. (1996) for estimates based on five years 
of follow-up data. 
38 In their analysis, MDRC defined the first year of post-random assignment to be quarters 2 through 5, year two as 
quarters 6 through 9, etc. In our analysis, we define year one as quarters 1 through 4, year two as quarters 5 through 
8, etc. This difference in definitions results in relatively minor differences between our years 1 through 5 estimates 
relative to those produced by MDRC.   28
ployment outcomes of its registrants contributed to why this program, and its work-first orienta-
tion, has been heralded nationally as a model welfare-to-work program. 
  In the longer run, however, the impacts on employment for the Riverside GAIN program 
diminished in magnitude and in statistical significance. In years 4 through 6 after random as-
signment, Riverside’s GAIN registrants experience a 6.9 percentage point annual average gain in 
annual rates of employment (down from 13.6 percentage points) and 0.25 quarters worked (down 
from 0.43 quarters) over their control group counterparts. For years 7 through 9, the Riverside 
GAIN registrants have an average annual gain of only 1.5 percentage points in annual rates of 
employment and 0.08 quarters worked per year relative to the control group and these latter im-
pacts estimates are no longer significantly different from zero.
39 The employment effects of the 
GAIN programs in Alameda and San Diego also decline in magnitude and statistical significance 
and the impacts attributable to GAIN in these counties remain substantially smaller than those 
for Riverside. In contrast, the estimated GAIN impacts for the Los Angeles program increased in 
magnitude in years 4 through 9 relative to those in the first three years for both measures of em-
ployment. On average, the GAIN program in Los Angeles was estimated to increase annual em-
ployment rates 3.3 (3.8) percentage points per year and the number of quarters worked by 0.10 
(1.3) per year in years 4 through 6 (years 7 through 9) after random assignment. These later-year 
estimate impacts for Los Angeles are all statistically significant and are larger than the effects 
found for the first three years after random assignment. Recall that the Los Angeles county 
GAIN program concentrated its services on long-term welfare recipients at the time our sample 
members were randomly assigned. Further recall that this program assigned the highest propor-
tion of its registrants to HCD training components of the four counties we analyzed from the 
                                                 
39 We also note that the average employment rates and quarters worked per year for experimentals in Riverside con-
sistently decline in magnitude over the nine-year. This is in contrast to the other 3 counties, where comparable out-
comes for experimentals in each of the other three counties increased over the nine-year follow-up period.   29
MDRC GAIN Evaluation. 
  The impacts of GAIN programs on annual earnings also are displayed in Table 3. As with 
the impacts on employment, the effects of receiving some training component on annual earnings 
for the Riverside and San Diego GAIN programs were sizeable—$1,416 per year in Riverside 
and $411in San Diego—and statistically significant in the first 3 years after random assignment. 
But, as we found for the estimated impacts on employment, the effects in these two counties both 
declined in magnitude and statistical significance over time. In contrast, the effects of the GAIN 
programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties were not large in magnitude in any of the peri-
ods after random assignment and were never statistically significant. 
  A closer inspection of Table 3 indicates that the mean employment and earnings out-
comes for the control groups are improving more rapidly over the nine-year period than they are 
for the experimental group in all counties but Los Angeles. In fact, in Riverside County both of 
the employment outcomes decline over time for the experimental group.
40 In particular, in all but 
Los Angeles County, the declines and/or stagnation in the experimental experimental impacts on 
economic outcomes after Years 1 through 3 result from more rapid improvements of the control 
group outcomes relative to those for the experimental group. Moreover, the economic outcomes 
for the experimental group in Riverside County actually declined after Year 3. In contrast, the 
means economic outcomes for the experimental group in Los Angeles county improved relative 
to this county’s control group after Year 3. 
  The fact that the economic outcomes of the control groups in Alameda, Riverside and 
San Diego Counties were improving more rapidly than the experimental group raises the possi-
bility that our longer-run impacts are “contaminated” because the control groups benefited from 
                                                 
40 This also is true for the annual employment outcome in San Diego.   30
GAIN services after the embargo on these services was lifted for this group. (Recall that the pro-
hibition of eligibility for any GAIN services to control group members was lifted on June 30, 
1993 and cases in this group could elect, but were not required, to participate in GAIN until July 
1, 1995.) Depending on when they were enrolled into the MDRC evaluation, control group mem-
bers were eligible to participate in GAIN activities anywhere from 3 to 4.5 years after their en-
rollment in this evaluation and actually were subject to a GAIN mandate from 5 to 6.5 years after 
enrollment if they were on AFDC. Thus, the decline in the Riverside experimental impacts in 
Years 4 through 9, for example, could be the result of some of the Riverside controls receiving 
GAIN training components after their embargo from services was lifted. This same source of 
“contamination” could afflict our long-term estimates of GAIN impacts for the other three coun-
ties.
41 If this occurred at sufficiently high rates among the control groups in these counties, it 
could compromise the interpretation of the estimated impacts for Years 4-6 and 7-9 presented in 
Table 3 as long-term impacts of GAIN. 
  In the Appendix we examine whether the improvements in control group economic out-
comes is likely to be explained by control group members being “contaminated” in Years 4 
through 9 by the fact that they received GAIN services after their embargo expired. While we 
cannot rule out this explanation, the calculations presented in the Appendix (see Table A-1) cast 
doubt upon its affect on the longer term experimental training effect estimates. We also note that, 
unlike the economic outcomes, the mean estimates for experimentals and controls decline over 
time in all four counties which is not consistent with the control group contamination explana-
tion. 
                                                 
41 The possibility of this “control group contamination” is quite salient, given that the early findings for Riverside 
County from MDRC’s evaluation led other counties in California to re-orient their GAIN programs towards the Riv-
erside work-first approach. For example, in 1995 Los Angeles County re-oriented its GAIN program to a “work-
first” program, attempting to model its program after Riverside’s.   31
  In summary, our examination of the long-term experimental estimates of the impacts of 
the GAIN programs in these four counties indicate some noticeable differences between the es-
timated experimental effects in the years immediately following random assignment (years 1 
through 3) compared to those at longer intervals after randomization (years 7 through 9). Fur-
thermore, the longer run impacts of Riverside’s GAIN program are somewhat less supportive of 
the view that the Riverside’s program, which placed greater emphasis on LFA versus HCD train-
ing components, dominated the training strategies in the other three counties, especially in the 
longer run. However, drawing the latter conclusion, while tempting, is subject to the flaw noted 
in the Introduction and Section 3, namely that the MDRC GAIN Evaluation experimental design 
does permit direct inferences about the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training compo-
nents. In the next section, we present evidence that attempts to shed light on such differential ef-
fects. 
4.2  Estimates of Differential Effects of LFA versus HCD Training Components 
  In this section we present estimates of the average differential effects of LFA versus 
HCD training components ( ( , ) s h γ A ) for the same set of outcomes considered in the previous sec-
tion with the data from the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. We present year-by-year estimates of 
(,) s h γ A  for the 9-year post-randomization period to facilitate the examination of how they vary 
with time since enrollment in GAIN training programs. 
  We begin by examining the results for the various tests of assumption (A-1′) using data 
for the control groups in the four MDRC GAIN Evaluation counties. The results of these tests 
are presented in Table 4. For each outcome, we present estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A , and their standard 
errors, based on data pooled for all four counties (columns labeled “Four County Ave.  ( , ) s h γ A ”) 
as well as P-values for the year-specific tests of whether all of the county-specific estimates of   32
(,) s h γ A  equal zero (columns labeled “P-Value,  ( , )
d
s h γ A  =0 for all d”). The first two columns for 
each outcome contain results from regressions that do not adjust for control variables, while the 
third and fourth columns contain results that control for Z using regression specifications in (6) 
and (6′), respectively. 
  Several consistent patterns for the various outcomes emerge from these tests. First, with 
no controls for background characteristics or pre-random assignment outcome variables, the test 
for whether the differential effects of LFA versus HCD are zero is always rejected for the All 
County estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  and typically rejected when we allow for county specific effects of 
(,) s h γ A . Recall that these tests are being conducted on data for members of the controls groups, 
who did not receive any GAIN training component for at least the first three years after random 
assignment. As such, there should be no differential effects of one training component over an-
other for these groups. The results of these tests provide clear evidence that there were selective 
differences in the populations and/or strategies for assigning LFA versus HCD training compo-
nents across counties which implies that assumption (A-1) does not hold across counties. 
  Second, after controlling for background characteristics and pre-random assignment out-
come variables, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the All County  ( , ) s h γ A ’s equal zero for any 
of the employment or earnings outcomes. The same conclusion holds for the county-specific es-
timates of  ( , ) s h γ A  for most years. That is, after controlling for Z, the test results in Table 4 pro-
vide substantial support for the validity of assumption (A-1′) for the employment and earnings 
outcomes. The latter findings help to justify the application of the regression-adjustment methods 
we use to estimate the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training on these outcomes.
42 
                                                 
42 While not reported here, we conducted the same tests of assumption (A-1′) for outcomes that measured post-
randomization welfare participation. These results are found at www.econ.ucla.edu/hotz/GAIN_extra_results.pdf.   33
  Given the test results in Table 4, we next consider estimates of the average training ef-
fects of LFA versus HCD training components derived from regression-adjustment methods. In 
Table 5, we present the Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  based on the re-
gression specification in (7), where we use data for the experimental and the control groups of 
the MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Corresponding estimates derived from estimating the regression 
specification in (6) with only experimental group data are presented in Table 6. As we noted 
above, the DID estimates in Table 5 represent, in our view, more conservative estimates of the 
average differential effects of LFA versus HCD training. Accordingly, we pay more attention to 
them in our discussion. Where appropriate, however, we do discuss some of the differences in 
the estimates across these two tables. We present three sets of estimates for each outcome in Ta-
ble 6. The first set, in the first column, does not adjust for Z; the second set, in the second col-
umn, adjusts for Z; the third set, in third column, adjusts for Z and post-random assignment val-
ues of the county-specific labor market conditions. 
  Consider the estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  for annual employment and earnings outcomes in Ta-
ble 5. Without controlling for Z, the estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  for all three outcomes are positive and 
statistically significant in the first four to five years after random assignment, with the positive 
(and significant) estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  persisting through year 6 for the annual earnings outcome. 
In the later years (after random assignment), the estimates turn negative and statistically insig-
nificant for the annual employment and annual number of quarters worked outcomes and become 
statistically insignificant for the annual earnings outcome, although the latter effects remain posi-
                                                                                                                                                             
Using the same testing strategy, we found that while the tests of the All County and county-specific values of the 
(,) s h γ A  = 0 hypothesis were typically not rejected, there are many more rejections of these tests for welfare parti-
ciaption, especially in years 8 and 9 after random assignment, than for the employment and earnings outcomes. 
Thus, it is less clear that using the regression-adjustment methods to estimate the differential effects of LFA versus 
HCD training is appropriate for estimating the differential treatment effects for post-randomziation welfare partici-
pation outcomes.   34
tive. Note that these unadjusted DID estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  implicitly assume that assumptions (A-
1) and (A-2) hold without any adjustments for population and/or training assignment differences 
across counties, and that labor market conditions are comparable over time and across counties. 
Based on these estimates, one would conclude that being assigned to LFA training components 
initially had stronger effects on these outcomes than did being assigned to HCD training compo-
nents, but that the advantage of LFA relative to HCD training largely vanishes in the longer run. 
  These results are entirely consistent with the experimental estimates produced by the 
original MDRC evaluation of GAIN Evaluation. As noted at the end of Section 4.1, such find-
ings have been inappropriately interpreted as implying that welfare-to-work programs that stress 
LFA training—as emphasized in Riverside county—are more effective in improving the eco-
nomic outcomes of those in welfare-to-work program relative to those that stress HCD training. 
Furthermore, the relative advantage of LFA training components appears to persist for a fairly 
long period (four to six years), which is notable from a training policy perspective. Finally, we 
note that the unadjusted estimates of differential effects of LFA versus HCD training for em-
ployment and earnings outcomes in Table 6, which are estimated using only experimental group 
data, are much larger in magnitude, especially in the initial years after random assignment, and 
statistically significant in each of the nine years after random assignment, although the estimated 
differential impacts appear to be unreasonably large in magnitude. 
  We next turn to the estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  which adjust for the background and pre-random 
assignment variables in Z. Recall that our tests of assumption (A-1′) using control group data 
provided evidence in support of adjusting for these variables to remove cross-county differences 
in population and treatment assignment heterogeneity. Relative to the unadjusted estimates just 
discussed, adjusting for Z leads to substantively different estimates of the relative impacts of   35
LFA versus HCD training on the post-random assignment employment and earnings outcomes, 
especially in the longer run. Consider the estimates in the second columns for each outcome in 
Table 5. While the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training has positive and statistically 
significant effects on all three of these outcomes in the first three years after random assignment, 
the effects become insignificant after Years 3 or 4, turn negative for the last three or four years 
after random assignment and are statistically significant in the case of annual employment. That 
is, a different conclusion emerges from this second set of estimates of the relative advantages of 
LFA versus HCD training on the employment and earnings of welfare-to-work participants, es-
pecially in the longer run. While the relative benefits of HCD training appear to take a while to 
emerge, based on this set of estimates, it does emerge at least for employment rates. Moreover, 
the relative advantages of HCD training appear to grow with time. A similar set of conclusions 
about the longer term advantages of HCD over LFA training of differential effects are also found 
for employment outcome after adjusting for background and pre-random assignment outcomes 
based on using only experimental group data (Table 6). We also find statistically significant esti-
mates in favor of HCD relative to LFA training for annual earnings starting six years after ran-
dom assignment. 
  Finally, we consider the effects that county-specific, post-randomization labor market 
conditions have on one’s inferences about the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training on 
employment and earnings outcomes. We present, in Table 5, estimates of  0(,) s h γ A , based on the 
regression specification in (10) and estimated with data for the experimental and control groups, 
as well as a corresponding set of estimates, in Table 6, based on a version of (10) that excludes 
the terms involving the experimental-control status indicator, T, and using only experimental 
group data only. Such estimates are found in the third columns of for each outcome in these ta-  36
bles. These estimates adjust for both Z and for measures of post-random assignment measures of 
county-specific total labor-to-population ratios and average real earnings per worker for the retail 
trade sector.
43 All of the post-randomization labor market conditions variables included in the 
regressions were measured as deviations from mean values for all four counties over the entire 
nine-year post-randomization period. Thus, the estimates of  0(,) s h γ A  correspond to what would 
prevail at these average all-county, time-invariant labor market conditions. At the bottom of each 
of these tables we also present P-values for the tests of the null hypothesis that the interactions of 
Mds with Ti,dc and  , dc i dc PT
A  (Table 5) and of Mds with  dc P
A  (Table 6) are all equal to zero. 
  Consider the findings in Table 5 based on data for both experimental and control group 
members. The P-values for the tests of no interactions of labor market conditions with Ti,dc and 
, dc i dc PT
A  are rejected for both the annual employment and annual quarters of work outcomes at 
conventional levels of significance, although this hypothesis cannot be rejected for annual earn-
ings. Comparing the estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  and  0(,) s h γ A  in columns 2 and 3, respectively, for the 
employment and earnings outcomes, there are two notable differences. First, one finds that the 
initial post-randomization estimates of  ( , ) s h γ A  that control for post-randomization labor market 
conditions are reduced in absolute value and are no longer statistically significant. Second, for all 
three outcomes, the longer term (seven to nine years after random assignment) estimated nega-
tive effects of LFA versus HCD training are almost twice the size (in absolute value) of the esti-
mates that just control for Z and, are statistically significant for both employment outcome meas-
ures. 
                                                 
43 While not shown here, we also estimated specifications of (10) in which Mds included county-specific measures of 
the employment-to-population ratios for the retail trade sector and the average real earnings per work in all sectors 
along with the total employment-to-population ratios and average real earnings per worker for retail trade. Control-
ling for this more comprehensive set of post-randomization county labor market conditions did not change the infer-
ences drawn from the more limited set of conditions used in Tables 5 and 6.   37
  The findings concerning the importance and consequences of interactions between post-
randomization labor market conditions and the estimated profiles for  ( , ) s h γ A  using only data 
from the experimental group presented in Table 6 are entirely similar to those found using ex-
perimental and control group data. We reject the null hypothesis of no interactions between post-
randomization labor market conditions and  dc P
A  and, adjusting for these conditions, we again find 
evidence of the longer run advantages of HCD over LFA training for the employment prospects 
of participants in the GAIN welfare-to-work programs. 
5.  Conclusions 
  In this paper we propose and implement non-experimental regression-adjustment meth-
ods in an attempt to isolate one of the potentially important reasons for across-program differ-
ences in training effects, namely that programs differ in the mix in and assignment of different 
types of training to the participants in its programs. The latter source of treatment heterogeneity 
and its potential consequences for across-program differences in training effects has been noted 
by Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer (2005) and others who have evaluated the effectiveness of train-
ing programs. We have demonstrated how one might isolate average differential treatment ef-
fects of different treatment components with one set of methods. Moreover, we have shown how 
one can exploit the presence of data on control groups—derived from an evaluation in which 
subjects are randomly assigned to control status or the receipt of some training component—in 
order to assess the validity of these regression-adjustment methods. Finally, using data for which 
we have nine years of post-treatment outcomes for participants in a random assignment experi-
ment, which allows us to estimate the longest term post-training effects of training programs of 
which we are aware, we have been able to investigate the longer, as well as shorter, run impacts 
of welfare-to-work training programs.   38
  As for the substantive implications of our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation 
data, our estimates lead to a rather different set of conclusions about the relative advantages of 
LFA versus HCD training programs on the post-training outcomes, especially in the longer run, 
than exists in the training evaluation literature. Recall from the Introduction that administrators 
of welfare-to-work programs across the country and welfare policy makers concluded from the 
success of the LFA-oriented Riverside GAIN program documented in the MDRC GAIN Evalua-
tion that the LFA approach was more successful (and cheaper) than the HCD approach for par-
ticipants in welfare-to-work training programs. 
  Based on our re-analysis of the MDRC GAIN Evaluation data using the regression-
adjustment methods developed above, we find that the LFA approach, at best, has only short-run 
advantages over the HCD approach with respect to the employment and earnings outcomes for 
low-skilled participants in California’s welfare-to-work program in the 1990s. Much of what has 
been interpreted as the relative advantage of the LFA to the HCD approach appears to stem from 
the relatively better local labor market conditions in Riverside county, especially over the first 
three to five years after random assignment. Moreover, at least for employment, we present evi-
dence that in the longer run (here some five to six years after training) HCD training components 
yield higher employment rates for its participants than does LFA training components. Finally, 
our estimates of the differential effects of LFA versus HCD training components indicate that the 
longer-term advantages of HCD versus LFA training components for economic outcomes can be 
sizeable. It follows that the extent to which welfare-to-work training programs care about more 
than quick fixes in their attempts to improve the self-sufficiency of its participants, our findings 
suggest that the use of training components that stress the development of work-related skills, 
rather than simply getting people jobs, needs to be reconsidered.   39
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Table 1 
Background Characteristics and Pre-Randomization Histories of GAIN Evaluation Participants from AFDC Caseload 
    Alameda  Los Angeles    Riverside  San Diego 
Variable   Mean*  Std. Dev. P-Value† Mean* Std.  Dev. P-Value†  Mean* Std.  Dev. P-Value† Mean* Std.  Dev. P-Value† 
Age  34.69 8.61 0.034  38.52 8.43 0.668  33.63 8.20 0.431  33.80 8.59 0.911 
White  0.18 0.38 0.806 0.12 0.32 0.621 0.52 0.50 0.533 0.43 0.49 0.263 
Hispanic  0.08 0.26 0.045 0.32 0.47 0.233 0.27 0.45 0.937 0.25 0.44 0.089 
Black  0.70 0.46 0.562 0.45 0.50 0.600 0.16 0.37 0.323 0.23 0.42 0.345 
Other Ethnic Groups  0.04 0.20 0.400 0.11 0.31 0.663 0.05 0.22 0.700 0.09 0.29 0.473 
Female-Head  0.95 0.22 0.978 0.94 0.24 0.043 0.88 0.33 0.633 0.84 0.37 0.349 
Only One Child  0.42 0.49 0.458 0.33 0.47 0.743 0.39 0.49 0.079 0.43 0.50 0.530 
More than One Child  0.57 0.50 0.391 0.67 0.47 0.976 0.58 0.49 0.093 0.53 0.50 0.621 
Child 0 to 5 Years  0.31 0.46 0.340 0.10 0.31 0.353 0.16 0.37 0.922 0.13 0.34 0.778 
Highest Grade Completed  11.18 2.52 0.921 9.54 3.55 0.548  10.68 2.53 0.938  10.66 3.04 0.373 
In Need of Basic Education  0.65 0.48 0.885 0.81 0.40 0.982 0.60 0.49 0.615 0.56 0.50 0.362 
Earnings 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign.  $213 $851  0.797 $221 $874 0.454 $452  $1,404 0.452 $588  $1,485 0.270 
Earnings 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.  $264 $1,018  0.012  $216  $866  0.405  $614 $1,603  0.073  $808 $1,879  0.747 
Earnings 8 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.  $220 $1,005  0.460  $181  $796  0.473  $728 $1,840  0.003  $827 $1,958  0.301 
Employed 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign.  0.14 0.34 0.531 0.12 0.33 0.469 0.22 0.42 0.664 0.27 0.44 0.118 
Employed 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.  0.14 0.34 0.000 0.13 0.33 0.634 0.25 0.43 0.976 0.29 0.45 0.926 
Employed 8 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.  0.13 0.33 0.896 0.11 0.32 0.565 0.27 0.44 0.044 0.28 0.45 0.149 
AFDC Benefits 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign.  $1,907 $526  0.331  $1,874 $663 0.792  $1,190  $1,043  0.499  $1,159 $903 0.046 
AFDC Benefits 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.  $1,822 $551  0.317  $1,867 $662 0.440 $995  $1,027  0.663  $1,008 $928 0.098 
On AFDC 1 Qtr. before Rand. Assign.  0.98 0.14 0.692 0.99 0.10 0.341 0.77 0.42 0.837 0.73 0.44 0.086 
On AFDC 4 Qtrs. before Rand. Assign.  0.96 0.19 0.982 0.98 0.14 0.765 0.63 0.48 0.973 0.60 0.49 0.102 
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1988:Q3                0.11  0.31  0.085  0.15  0.36  0.000 
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1988:Q4                0.18  0.38  0.073  0.24  0.43  0.000 
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1989:Q1                0.17  0.38  0.631  0.24  0.42  0.000 
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1989:Q2                0.17  0.37  0.299  0.21  0.41  0.205 
Prop.  Entered  GAIN  in  1989:Q3  0.26 0.44 0.944 0.56 0.50 0.000 0.13 0.34 0.699 0.16 0.37 0.000 
Prop.  Entered  GAIN  in  1989:Q4  0.21 0.41 0.767 0.26 0.44 0.000 0.13 0.34 0.746         
Prop.  Entered  GAIN  in  1990:Q1  0.32 0.47 0.769 0.18 0.39 0.244 0.11 0.31 0.165         
Prop. Entered GAIN in 1990:Q2  0.21  0.41  0.578                       
Number of Experimental Cases
  597       2,995    4,405       6,978      
Number of Control Cases
  601       1,400    1,040       1,154      
Total Number of Cases
  1,198        4,395        5,445        8,132       
Fraction of Cases in Experimental Group
  0.498        0.681          0.809        0.858       
 N OTE—Earnings and AFDC Benefits are deflated by Consumer Price Index; in 1999 dollars. 
  * Mean (and standard deviation) for full sample (i.e., experimental and control groups). 
  † P-Value for test of difference between experimental and control group means.   43
 
Table 2 
Distribution of Proportion of Participation in Various GAIN Training Components
1 
 
  Labor Force Attachment (LFA)  
Activities  Human Capital Development (HCD) Activities 
Yr:Qtr 
 




























Alameda                   
1988:Q3 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00  
1988:Q4 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00  
1989:Q1 0.21 0.00 0.21  0.53 0.26 0.00 0.79  
1989:Q2 0.34 0.02 0.36  0.37 0.27 0.00 0.64  
1989:Q3 0.35 0.02 0.37  0.36 0.27 0.00 0.63  0.700 
1989:Q4 0.33 0.09 0.42  0.44 0.12 0.00 0.56  0.683 
1990:Q1 0.29 0.05 0.34  0.44 0.22 0.00 0.66  0.624 
1990:Q2 0.45 0.03 0.48  0.38 0.13 0.01 0.52  0.610 
Los Angeles                   
1988:Q3   N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A N/A N/A   N/A   
1988:Q4 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00  
1989:Q1 0.14 0.00 0.14  0.72 0.14 0.00 0.86  
1989:Q2 0.23 0.01 0.24  0.61 0.15 0.00 0.76  
1989:Q3 0.22 0.02 0.24  0.68 0.08 0.00 0.76  0.797 
1989:Q4 0.23 0.04 0.27  0.65 0.08 0.00 0.73  0.816 
1990:Q1 0.19 0.07 0.26  0.63 0.12 0.00 0.75  0.818 
1990:Q2 0.16 0.05 0.21  0.64 0.15 0.00 0.79  
Riverside           
1988:Q3 0.51 0.09 0.60  0.21 0.20 0.00 0.41  0.658 
1988:Q4 0.62 0.07 0.69  0.20 0.10 0.00 0.30  0.597 
1989:Q1 0.56 0.03 0.59  0.26 0.14 0.00 0.40  0.591 
1989:Q2 0.63 0.05 0.68  0.20 0.12 0.00 0.32  0.599 
1989:Q3 0.64 0.03 0.67  0.19 0.14 0.01 0.34  0.581 
1989:Q4 0.45 0.02 0.47  0.32 0.21 0.00 0.53  0.574 
1990:Q1 0.52 0.03 0.55  0.23 0.22 0.00 0.45  0.627 
1990:Q2 0.52 0.01 0.53  0.24 0.23 0.00 0.47  
San Diego           
1988:Q3 0.41 0.01 0.42  0.28 0.28 0.01 0.57  0.567 
1988:Q4 0.45 0.01 0.46  0.30 0.22 0.01 0.53  0.545 
1989:Q1 0.41 0.01 0.42  0.30 0.24 0.02 0.56  0.585 
1989:Q2 0.42 0.02 0.44  0.31 0.21 0.02 0.54  0.578 
1989:Q3 0.28 0.05 0.33  0.42 0.23 0.01 0.66  0.528 
1989:Q4 0.30 0.06 0.36  0.27 0.28 0.04 0.59  
1990:Q1 0.34 0.08 0.42  0.33 0.21 0.02 0.56  
1990:Q2 0.31 0.06 0.37  0.41 0.15 0.02 0.58  
 N OTE—Areas in boxes depict the quarters in which random assignment was conducted in the various counties. PREP stands for “Pre-
Employment Preparation. This was California’s form of Workfare, i.e., it was unpaid work experience. 
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Table 3 
Experimental Estimates of Annual Impacts of GAIN 




Exper. Control  Diff. 
 
Exper. Control  Diff.  Exper. Control  Diff.  Exper. Control  Diff. 
Annual Employment (%)               
1-3    30.8 28.1  2.7    26.1 24.5  1.7  49.0 35.3 13.6***  45.1 40.8  4.3*** 
       (2.2)       (1.2)    (1.3)    (1.3) 
4-6    37.0 34.7  2.3    29.2 25.8  3.3***  40.4 33.5  6.9***  40.8 38.2  2.6* 
       (2.4)       (1.3)     (1.4)     (1.4) 
7-9    45.3 45.3  0.0    36.9  33.1 3.8***  39.3  37.8 1.5 41.0  40.9 0.1 
      (2.6)      (1.4)     (1.4)     (1.4) 
Annual Number of Quarters Worked               
1-3    0.80 0.75 0.05    0.71 0.67 0.04  1.33 0.90 0.43***  1.25 1.09 0.15*** 
       (0.07)       (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04) 
4-6    1.12 1.02 0.10    0.87 0.77 0.10**  1.23 0.98 0.25***  1.26 1.17 0.09* 
       (0.08)       (0.04)     (0.05)     (0.05) 
7-9    1.47 1.42 0.05    1.16 1.03 0.13*** 1.23 1.15 0.08  1.32 1.28 0.04 
      (0.09)      (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.05) 
Annual Earnings (1999$)             
1-3    2,333 1,849  484    1,843 1,849  -6  3,668 2,253 1,416*** 3,781 3,165  616*** 
       (302)       (149)    (208)    (208) 
4-6    4,069 3,342  727    2,615 2,493  122  4,363 3,201 1,162*** 4,849 4,315  534* 
       (464)       (196)     (283)     (283) 
7-9    5,871 5,206  665    3,689 3,386  302  4,585 4,174  411  5,394 4,948  446 
      (563)      (236)     (308)     (308) 
 N OTE—Sample: AFDC-FG Cases in MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* denotes statistically significant at 10% level. 
** denotes statistically significant at 5% level. 
*** denotes statistically significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4  
Tests of Assumption (A-1′) 
    Annual Employment (%)  Annual Quarters Worked  Annual Earnings (1999$) 








s h γ A  









s h γ A  









s h γ A  
=0 for all 








s h γ A  









s h γ A  









s h γ A  
=0 for all 
d 
Year 1    37.5***   0.3322  -21.8  0.4288  0.72*** 0.1688    -0.83  0.3122  727  0.2937  -2,263  0.7950 
    (5.5)      (21.6)     (0.15)      (0.57)     (522)    (1,828)    
Year 2    42.6***   0.6933  -5.0  0.4577  0.96*** 0.5195    0.24  0.2980  2,755*** 0.7372  2,448  0.2857 
    (5.6)      (23.9)     (0.17)      (0.71)     (718)    (2,883)    
Year 3    44.1***   0.9856  -3.8  0.9826  1.14*** 0.6009    -0.40  0.5694  3,376*** 0.5741  193  0.2428 
    (5.4)      (24.7)     (0.17)      (0.76)     (760)    (3,155)    
Year 4    41.1***   0.7877  -13.1  0.1693  1.14*** 0.8604    -0.21  0.3774  4,241*** 0.3899  248  0.6496 
    (5.5)      (24.6)     (0.18)      (0.80)     (826)    (3,385)    
Year 5    29.0***   0.0337  -20.5  0.0848  0.89*** 0.1321    -0.03  0.2912  3,401*** 0.1106  1,790  0.5832 
    (5.5)      (24.3)     (0.18)      (0.82)     (879)    (3,760)    
Year 6    23.1***   0.0131  -13.1  0.5829  0.77*** 0.0119    -0.31  0.5393  3,796*** 0.0471  3,225  0.2597 
    (5.6)      (25.6)     (0.19)      (0.86)     (923)    (3,847)    
Year 7    25.8***   0.0326  -16.9  0.0735  0.79*** 0.0111    0.07  0.1632  3,583*** 0.0110  2,569  0.1020 
    (5.7)      (26.0)     (0.19)      (0.90)     (938)    (4,267)    
Year 8    19.2***   0.0755  -30.2  0.6259  0.57*** 0.0027    -0.55  0.5708  3,794*** 0.0020  446  0.4018 
    (5.8)      (26.2)     (0.20)      (0.92)     (961)    (4,753)    
Year 9    21.7***   0.3908  3.2  0.9573  0.55*** 0.0310    -0.53  0.9511  3,814*** 0.0143  -2,625  0.5829 
      (5.9)     (26.5)   (0.20)    (0.93)    (1,075)    (4,947)  
Control  for:                          
  Personal/Family Characteristics    No      Yes    No      Yes    No    Yes   
  Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.    No      Yes    No      Yes    No    Yes   
 N OTE—Sample: AFDC-FG Control Group Cases from MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by the size of the caseload in County of Residence 
in Year/Quarter enrolled in GAIN evaluation. Regressions also include the following covariates: 
 Personal/Family  Characteristics: Age, Age
2; dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, Other Ethnic Group; Only 1 Child; Single, Some High School, High School Graduate, Some College, College 
Graduate, College Plus, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q1, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN 
in 1989:Q2, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1990:Q1, Resided in Los Angeles County, Resided in 
Riverside County, Resided in San Diego County; and Whether Classified as “In Need of Basic Education” by GAIN program; and Growth Rate in Real Earnings per Worker in County of Residence 
as of Quarter of Random Assignment and Growth Rate in Employment-to-Population in County of Residence. All variables are measured as of the quarter of random assignment.  
  Pre-RA (Random Assignment) Earnings, AFDC, Employment: dummy variables for Not Employed in Any of 8 Quarters prior to RA, Not Employed in Any of 10 Quarters prior to RA, Employed 
in Quarter X before RA, X = 1,…,10, and On AFDC in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,6; and Earnings in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,10 and Amount of AFDC Payment in Quarter X prior to 
RA, X = 1,…,4. 
  County Labor Market Conditions: Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population for County of Residence in Year t and Annual Retail Trade Earnings per Worker (in 1000s of 1999$) for 
County of Residence in Year t. 
  * significant at 10%;  
  ** significant at 5%;  
  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Differential Effects of Labor Force Attachment (LFA)  
vs. Human Capital Development (HCD) Programs – Experimental and Control Groups 
Year after Random Assignment    Annual Employment (%)  Annual Quarters Worked    Annual Earnings (1999$) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 1  35.6*** 32.3*** 25.6**  1.04*** 0.92*** 0.67*    3,168*** 1,518*  -673 
  (6.5) (6.6)  (12.0) (0.18) (0.20) (0.40)    (613)  (815) (2,033) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 2  34.1*** 30.8*** 19.8*  1.24*** 1.12*** 0.74** 
  4,842*** 3,192*** 842 
  (6.5) (6.8)  (10.9) (0.20) (0.22) (0.37)    (837)  (973) (1,892) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 3  19.3*** 16.0**  3.6  0.80*** 0.68*** 0.27 
  4,305*** 2,656*** 1,028 
  (6.3) (6.7) (9.6) (0.20) (0.22) (0.33)    (899)  (1,020)  (1,684) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 4  13.0** 9.7  -2.3  0.54*** 0.42*  0.02 
  3,431*** 1,781*  707 
  (6.4) (6.8) (9.8) (0.21) (0.23) (0.34)    (963)  (1,074)  (1,758) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 5  11.2* 8.0 -6.3  0.40* 0.28 -0.18 
  3,257*** 1,607  390 
  (6.5) (6.8)  (10.0) (0.21) (0.23) (0.35)    (1,025) (1,127) (1,812) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 6  -1.9 -5.1  -19.5*  0.06 -0.07 -0.52 
  2,164** 514  -461 
  (6.6) (6.9)  (10.1) (0.22) (0.24) (0.35)    (1,077) (1,182) (1,833) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 7  -11.8* -15.1**  -31.8*** -0.30 -0.42*  -0.93*** 
  1,492 -158  -1,184 
  (6.7) (7.1)  (10.2) (0.22) (0.24) (0.36)    (1,098) (1,210) (1,860) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 8  -9.3 -12.6*  -30.6*** -0.20 -0.32 -0.86** 
  441 -1,208 -2,275 
  (6.8) (7.1)  (10.1) (0.23) (0.25) (0.36)    (1,128) (1,241) (1,856) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 9  -14.5** -17.8** -32.4*** -0.29 -0.42 -0.85** 
  23 -1,627 -2,518 
    (6.9) (7.3) (9.6) (0.24) (0.26) (0.34)    (1,250)  (1,346)  (1,823) 
P-Value for joint test that coefficients 
on  , ds i dc M T  and  , dc ds i dc PMT
A  = 0 
 
   0.0173     0.0605 
 
   0.1601 
Control  for:                   
  Personal/Family Characteristics    No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
  Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.    No Yes Yes  No  Yes Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
  Post-RA County Lab. Mkt. Cond.    No No Yes  No  No Yes    No  No  Yes 
 N OTE—Sample: AFDC Experimental and Control Group Cases from MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are 
weighted by the size of the caseload in County of Residence in Year: Quarter enrolled in GAIN evaluation. Regressions also include the following covari-
ates: 
 Personal/Family  Characteristics:  Age, Age
2; dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, Other Ethnic Group; Only 1 Child; Single, Some High School, 
High School Graduate, Some College, College Graduate, College Plus, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN 
in 1988:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q1, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q2, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q3, 
Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1990:Q1, Resided in Los Angeles County, Resided in Riverside 
County, Resided in San Diego County; and Whether Classified as “In Need of Basic Education” by GAIN program; and Growth Rate in Real Earnings 
per Worker in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment and Growth Rate in Employment-to-Population in County of Residence. All of 
these variables are interacted with experimental status. All variables measured as of quarter of random assignment. 
  Pre-RA (Random Assignment) Earnings, AFDC, Employment: dummy variables for Not Employed in Any of 8 Quarters prior to RA, Not Employed in 
Any of 10 Quarters prior to RA, Employed in Quarter X before RA, X = 1,…,10, and On AFDC in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,6; and Earnings in 
Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,10 and Amount of AFDC Payment in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,4. All of these variables are interacted with ex-
perimental status. 
  Post-RA County Labor Market Conditions: Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population and the Annual Retail Trade Earnings per Worker (in 
1000s of 1999$) for County of Residence in Year t. All of these variables are interacted with experimental status and experimental status × Proportion in 
LFA Activities based on Case’s County of Residence and Year: Quarter of Entry into GAIN. 
 *significant  at  10%. 
  ** significant at 5%. 
  *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Differential Effects of Labor Force Attachment (LFA) vs.  
Human Capital Development (HCD) Programs – Experimental Group Only 
Year after Random Assignment    Annual Employment  Annual Quarters Worked    Annual Earnings 
(,) h γ A  in Year 1  73.1*** 20.5**  29.2**  1.76***  0.06  0.16    3,894*** -5,305*** -7,375***
  (3.3) (9.2)  (13.5) (0.09) (0.33) (0.48)    (321) (1,669) (2,600) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 2  76.7*** 24.0*** 25.8*  2.20***  0.51  0.36    7,597*** -1,603 -4,302 
  (3.3) (9.2)  (13.8) (0.11) (0.33) (0.50)    (428) (1,667) (2,693) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 3  63.4*** 10.8  -0.3  1.94***  0.25  -0.33    7,681*** -1,518 -5,020* 
  (3.3) (9.1)  (15.2) (0.11) (0.33) (0.55)    (479) (1,669) (2,988) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 4  54.1*** 1.4  -17.4  1.68***  -0.01  -0.86    7,672*** -1,528 -5,619* 
  (3.3) (9.1)  (16.7) (0.11) (0.33) (0.60)    (495) (1,674) (3,298) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 5  40.3*** -12.4  -34.6*  1.29***  -0.40  -1.39**    6,658*** -2,542 -7,117** 
  (3.4) (9.1)  (18.1) (0.11) (0.33) (0.65)    (526) (1,679) (3,528) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 6  21.2***  -31.4*** -56.1*** 0.83*** -0.86*** -1.92***    5,960*** -3,240* -7,790** 
  (3.5) (9.1)  (18.2) (0.12) (0.33) (0.65)    (555) (1,686) (3,540) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 7  14.1***  -38.6*** -64.2*** 0.49*** -1.20*** -2.25***    5,074*** -4,126** -8,335** 
  (3.5) (9.1)  (17.9) (0.12) (0.33) (0.64)    (570) (1,689) (3,470) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 8  9.9***  -42.8*** -69.2*** 0.37*** -1.32*** -2.39***    4,235*** -4,965*** -9,122***
  (3.5) (9.2)  (17.7) (0.12) (0.33) (0.63)    (592) (1,693) (3,413) 
(,) h γ A  in Year 9  7.1** -45.5*** -69.7*** 0.26**  -1.43*** -2.45***    3,837*** -5,363*** -9,525***
    (3.6) (9.2)  (16.6) (0.13) (0.33) (0.59)    (637) (1,715) (3,216) 
P-Value for joint test that coefficients 
on  dc ds PM
A  = 0 
 
   0.0420     0.0828 
 
   0.3462 
Control  for:                     
  Personal/Family Characteristics    No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
  Pre-RA Earnings, AFDC & Employ.    No Yes Yes  No  Yes Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
  Post-RA County Lab. Mkt. Cond.    No No Yes  No  No Yes    No  No  Yes 
 N OTE—Sample: AFDC Experimental Group Cases Only from MDRC GAIN Evaluation. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted 
by the size of the caseload in County of Residence in Year: Quarter enrolled in GAIN evaluation. Regressions also include the following covariates: 
 Personal/Family  Characteristics: Age, Age
2; dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, Other Ethnic Group; Only 1 Child; Single, Some High School, 
High School Graduate, Some College, College Graduate, College Plus, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1988:Q3, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN 
in 1988:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q1, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q2, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q3, 
Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1989:Q4, Registered and Enrolled in GAIN in 1990:Q1, Resided in Los Angeles County, Resided in Riverside 
County, Resided in San Diego County; and Whether Classified as “In Need of Basic Education” by GAIN program; and Growth Rate in Real Earnings 
per Worker in County of Residence as of Quarter of Random Assignment and Growth Rate in Employment-to-Population in County of Residence. All 
variables are measured as of quarter of random assignment.  
  Pre-RA (Random Assignment) Earnings, AFDC, Employment: dummy variables for Not Employed in Any of 8 Quarters prior to RA, Not Employed in 
Any of 10 Quarters prior to RA, Employed in Quarter X before RA, X = 1,…,10, and On AFDC in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,6; and Earnings in 
Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,10 and Amount of AFDC Payment in Quarter X prior to RA, X = 1,…,4. 
  Post-RA County Labor Market Conditions: Ratio of Total Employment to Adult Population and the Annual Retail Trade Earnings per Worker (in 
1000s of 1999$) for County of Residence in Year t. 
  * significant at 10%. 
  ** significant at 5%. 
  *** significant at 1%. 
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FIG. 4—Annual Earnings per Worker, Retail Trade Sector   50
Appendix 
 
Potential Contamination of Long-Term Experimental GAIN Estimates due to Expiration of 
Embargo from GAIN Services for Control Group Members 
 
  To investigate the potential importance of the possibility that the improvement in the con-
trol group outcomes over Years 4 through 9 after random assignment can account for the decline 
in the longer-term estimated impacts of GAIN on economic outcomes, we examine the extent to 
which the improvements in control group economic outcomes might be explained by control 
group members receiving and benefiting from GAIN services in Years 4 through 9. In Table A-
1, we compare the trends in actual control group economic outcomes for each of the four coun-
ties with estimates of these outcomes based on the assumption that all control group members 
that were on AFDC experienced the mean outcomes for their county’s experimental group, with 
a three year lag due to the initial embargo. The notes in Table A-1 explain exactly how we cal-
culated these latter estimates. In that Table, we reproduce the actual mean outcomes for the con-
trol groups of each county from Table 3 and compare them with what we estimate their outcomes 
would have been if the fraction of these groups that were on AFDC in Years 4 through 6 experi-
enced the mean outcome for the experimental group with a three year lag. As seen from Table A-
1, we find that for most of the economic outcomes—especially for the earnings outcomes—and 
in most of the counties these estimated outcomes are, on average, less than the actual outcomes 
experienced by control group members. That is, it appears that only part of the improvement in 
the economic outcomes for control group members could be explained by the control group re-
ceiving and benefiting from GAIN services after their embargo from receipt of these services 
was lifted. The one exception to this conclusion is for the annual employment outcome in River-
side County, where the estimates based on this explanation either over-predict or slightly under-
predict the actual rise for the control group in this county. We note that this exception is of some   51
importance, given that Riverside’s GAIN program was demonstrated to be effective at increasing 
employment rates in the MDRC 3-Year study. 
  While we cannot rule out the “contaminated control group” explanation for the decline in 
the longer-term impacts of GAIN in Riverside County shown in Table 3, the calculations pre-
sented in Table A-1 certainly raise questions about its validity. As a final consideration, we note 
that we do not find any differences by experimental-control group status in the trends for the 
AFDC participation outcomes in Table 3. In particular, for both the Ever-Received AFDC/TANF 
and Number of Quarters on AFDC/TANF outcome measures, we find that the mean estimates 
for experimentals and controls decline over time at approximately the same rate in Riverside 
County as in the other three counties. 
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Table A-1 
Comparison of Control Group Outcomes with Estimates under Assumption that Controls on AFDC had the Same Mean Out-
comes as Experimental Group 









































Ever Employed in Year (%)             
1-3    28.1  28.1 0.0%  24.5  24.5 0.0%  35.3  35.3 0.0%  40.8  40.8 0.0% 
4-6    34.7 29.8  -14.3%  25.8 25.4  1.7%  33.5 41.4 23.7%  38.2 42.7 11.7% 
7-9    45.3  31.6 -30.1%  33.1  26.1 -21.1% 37.8  36.8  -2.8% 40.9  40.8  -0.3% 
Number of Quarters Worked in Year              
1-3    0.75  0.75 0.0%  0.67  0.67 0.0%  0.90  0.90 0.0%  1.09  1.09 0.0% 
4-6    1.02  0.78 -23.3% 0.77  0.69 -10.4% 0.98  1.09  10.9% 1.17  1.16  -1.0% 
7-9    1.42  0.90 -36.9% 1.03  0.74 -28.1% 1.15  0.99 -13.9% 1.28  1.14 -10.8% 
Annual Earnings (1999$)                
1-3    $1,849 $1,849  0.0%  $1,849 $1,849  0.0%  $2,253 $2,253  0.0%  $3,165 $3,165  0.0% 
4-6    $3,342 $2,155  -35.5%  $2,493 $1,846  -25.9%  $3,201 $2,885 -9.9%  $4,315 $3,439  -20.3% 
7-9   $5,206  $2,733 -47.5%  $3,386  $2,122 -37.3% $4,174  $2,853  -31.6%  $4,948  $3,651  -26.2% 
 N OTE—The values for the “Est. (Mean) Outcome” are calculated as follows. In Years 1-3 (t=1_3),  1_3 1_3 ˆ (0) (0) tt YY == =  and for Years 4-6 and 7-9 (t=4_6 and 
7_9),  () 11 1 1 _ 3 ˆ(0) ( ) 1 (0)
AFDC AFDC
tt t d t t YPY k P Y −− − = ≡× + − × ,where  1_3(0) t Y =  is the mean outcome for the control group in period Years 1-3;  1
AFDC
t P−  is the proportion of 
control group on AFDC in period t-1; and  1() td Yk −  is the mean outcome for experimental group in period t-1 (t-1 = 1_3 and 4_6, respectively). 
 
 
 